Case Law Series Part 1 - The Cases Behind the Fight

Why Gun Rights Cannot Be Reduced to Paper Rights

INTRODUCTION

Rhode Island’s gun debate is usually argued as a matter of policy. Supporters of new restrictions say the laws are needed for public safety. Opponents say the bills punish lawful citizens while doing little to stop criminals. But underneath that political fight is a legal question the state cannot avoid forever: how far can government go before a constitutional right exists only on paper?

Over the next couple of weeks, we will be laying out a case that Rhode Island’s recent and pending gun laws are not just controversial policy, but legally vulnerable. This series will begin with the major court decisions that define the modern Second Amendment landscape, then apply those rulings to Rhode Island’s recently passed laws, the current slate of 2026 bills, the Ocean State Tactical litigation, and the possibility of federal scrutiny if state level restrictions continue to collide with constitutional protections.

This series began with a case law reference sheet we made available at our table during last month’s Senate gun bill hearings. We will expand on those case summaries before applying them to Rhode Island’s recent laws and pending legislation.

The central issue is not whether lawmakers can regulate firearms at all. The issue is whether they can make the exercise of the right so expensive, delayed, limited, bureaucratic, or risky that ordinary citizens are left with a right in theory, but not in practice.

KEY CASES

NYSRPA v Bruen

The modern starting point is District of Columbia v. Heller. In that 2008 decision, the United States Supreme Court held that the Second Amendment protects an individual right to keep and bear arms, independent of service in a militia. The case specifically struck down Washington, D.C.’s handgun ban and its requirement that firearms in the home be kept inoperable, because those laws prevented ordinary citizens from using functional firearms for lawful self-defense.

Heller is often misrepresented as a case only about self-defense inside the home. That is too narrow. The Court described self-defense in the home as the central example before it, but it also spoke more broadly about the right to possess and use arms for traditionally lawful purposes. That distinction matters. The case did not say the Second Amendment exists only at the bedroom door.

Fourteen years later, the Supreme Court decided New York State Rifle & Pistol Association v. Bruen. That case struck down New York’s requirement that citizens show a special need before receiving a public carry license. More importantly, Bruen changed the way courts are supposed to review gun laws.

Before Bruen, many courts used a balancing test. Judges asked whether a gun law served an important government interest and whether the burden on the citizen seemed reasonable. Bruen rejected that approach. The Court said that when the Second Amendment’s text covers the conduct at issue, the government must show that its restriction fits within the nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation.

In plain English, the state does not win just because it claims a law might improve public safety. It has to prove that the law is consistent with the constitutional tradition that the Second Amendment protects.

Caetano v Massachusetts

Caetano v. Massachusetts adds another important piece. In that case, the Supreme Court rejected the idea that stun guns could be excluded from Second Amendment protection simply because they did not exist at the founding. The right is not frozen in the 1700s. Modern bearable arms are not automatically outside constitutional protection merely because technology changed.

That principle is critical in debates over semiautomatic firearms, stun guns, electronic defensive tools, and other modern arms. Government cannot avoid the Second Amendment by labeling a protected arm too modern or too unfamiliar.

Practical Access

Other cases focus on practical access. In Ezell v. City of Chicago, the Seventh Circuit recognized that the right to keep and bear arms includes the practical ability to train and maintain proficiency. Chicago could not recognize firearm training as necessary while using zoning rules to effectively prevent ranges from operating. A right that cannot be practiced, trained with, or maintained is not fully real.

That same access principle appears in cases like Nguyen v. Bonta and Rhode v. Bonta. Nguyen involved California’s one gun per month law. The Ninth Circuit held that the Second Amendment protects the right to acquire firearms, including more than one firearm, and that government cannot ration a constitutional right by allowing its exercise only once every 30 days.

Rhode challenged California’s ammunition background check system. The case is still procedurally developing, but the basic issue is obvious: a firearm without ammunition is not meaningfully useful. If government can block, delay, or repeatedly deny access to ammunition, it can burden the right without banning the gun itself.

We also need to look at the First Amendment and voting rights cases because they show how courts have treated financial barriers to constitutional rights. In Murdock v. Pennsylvania, the Supreme Court struck down a license tax imposed on religious solicitors, holding that government may not charge people for the privilege of exercising a constitutional right. In Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections, the Court struck down Virginia’s poll tax, holding that wealth or fee payment cannot be made a condition of voting.

Those cases are not Second Amendment cases, but the principle carries weight. Constitutional rights cannot be reserved for citizens who can afford the price of admission. When lawmakers propose mandatory training fees, insurance requirements, licensing charges, or other financial gates before a person may exercise a protected right, they are walking into dangerous legal territory.

Finally, Smith & Wesson Brands v. Mexico shows another boundary. The Supreme Court rejected Mexico’s attempt to hold American firearm manufacturers liable for violence committed by third parties using their products. The Court held that federal law protects lawful firearm businesses from being turned into insurers for criminal misuse unless a valid statutory exception is met. That case in relevant as states consider laws designed to create new pathways for lawsuits against firearm manufacturers and sellers.

WHAT THIS MEANS

Taken together, these cases point to a simple theme. Government may punish crime. It may regulate in areas where history and tradition support regulation. But it cannot hollow out a constitutional right by surrounding it with delays, fees, rationing systems, access barriers, possession bans, or legal traps.

That is the danger now facing Rhode Island.

The state has already passed several major gun laws in recent years, including a magazine ban, an age based purchase restriction, a safe storage law, and a ban on the future sale and transfer of certain semiautomatic firearms. The 2026 bills go even further, with proposals touching ammunition purchases, mandatory training, firearm insurance, one gun per month limits, industry liability, and even possession of arms that were previously lawful to own.

The next article in this series will apply these principles to the 2026 Rhode Island gun bills now before the General Assembly. Most of those bills do not merely target criminal misuse. They would restrict acquisition, ammunition, possession, training, or the financial ability to keep arms at all.

That is where policy debate becomes a constitutional fight.

Case Law Series Part 1 – The Cases Behind the Fight